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Immanuel Kant
Critique of Pure Reason
The Two Editions: 1781 and 1787
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Commentary by ChatGPT
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)
Prefatory comment:
I recommend this section before we begin the Prefaces themselves.
There is a special reason: the Critique exists in two substantially different versions, and we need to understand that fact before reading it closely.
What this document would accomplish
1. Why Kant wrote the first edition in 1781
What problem he thought he had solved and what he was trying to accomplish.
2. Why he revised it in 1787
The second edition was not merely a proofreading exercise. Kant substantially rewrote portions of the work, especially material concerning the relation between sensibility and understanding and the famous Transcendental Deduction.
3. What the A/B notation means
- A = 1781 first edition
- B = 1787 second edition
This will become our permanent navigational system.
4. What changed philosophically
We will identify the major changes without getting prematurely buried in technical detail.
5. Which version we will follow
My recommendation is that we read the 1787 text as our primary route, while bringing in the 1781 text whenever the difference is philosophically significant.
That gives us the best of both worlds: we experience Kant's mature revision while retaining the earlier formulation when it illuminates his development.
6. A warning about translations
Since you previously worked with more than one translation, this is worth establishing at the outset. We should not become prisoners of any one English translator. When a Kantian sentence is especially important or ambiguous, we can compare translations and, when necessary, look at the German terminology behind them.
Kant - Critique of Pure Reason
Background: The Two Editions: 1781 and 1787
Before we begin Kant's Prefaces, there is one piece of orientation we should absolutely have: there are really two versions of the Critique.
The first appeared in 1781. Six years later, in 1787, Kant published a substantially revised second edition. The standard scholarly practice is therefore to cite the first edition as A and the second as B—for example, A51/B75.
This is not a minor bibliographical curiosity. It will matter to us throughout the study.
1. Why Did Kant Revise the Book?
The first edition did not receive the reception Kant hoped for.
One particularly important early review, associated with Christian Garve and published anonymously in 1782, interpreted Kant's position in a way Kant regarded as seriously mistaken. The reception helped prompt Kant to clarify and modify his presentation.
The result was the 1787 edition.
Kant himself presents the second edition as a clarification rather than a fundamental abandonment of his original project.
But the revisions are substantial enough that scholars have long debated whether some differences between A and B are merely differences of presentation or involve genuine shifts in emphasis or doctrine.
For us, that debate is interesting—but we should not begin by taking sides.
We will let the two texts speak.
2. The Most Important Thing to Understand
The 1787 Critique is not simply the 1781 book with corrections made to it.
Kant rewrote or substantially revised important portions.
Among the major revised areas are:
- the Preface
- the Introduction
- parts of the Transcendental Aesthetic
- the Transcendental Deduction
- the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena
- the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.
The Transcendental Deduction is especially important. Kant was attempting to establish the legitimate application of the pure concepts of understanding—the categories—to objects of experience. The A and B versions of this argument are substantially different in their development.
So when we reach the Deduction, I do not want to summarize the B version and simply mention that "Kant said something different in 1781."
We should actually compare them.
3. Why the Two Editions Are Valuable to Us
There is a wonderful opportunity here.
Usually, when we study a philosopher, we have the finished argument before us.
With Kant, we get something unusual:
We can watch Kant revise his own attempt to solve an enormous philosophical problem.
The 1781 and 1787 editions allow us to ask:
What did Kant initially think he had accomplished?
↓
What difficulties did he discover?
↓
What did he think needed clarification?
↓
What did he rewrite?
↓
Did the revision actually solve the problem?
That last question is especially interesting.
4. A Mental Picture: The Architect Revises the Building
Imagine Kant in 1781 completing an enormous architectural structure.
He steps back.
The building stands.
But the first visitors say:
"We don't understand what this building is."
Some misunderstand its purpose.
Some think it has implications Kant doesn't intend.
Kant therefore returns to the building.
He does not demolish it.
Instead, he:
- strengthens certain foundations,
- redesigns certain rooms,
- changes some entrances,
- removes some passages,
- rewrites others,
- makes certain relationships between the parts more explicit.
The 1787 building is therefore the same great architectural project—but not quite the same building.
That is how I suggest we think about A and B.
5. The A/B Pagination Will Be Our Coordinates
This is something I want us to establish firmly now.
Whenever you see:
Axxx
we are referring to the 1781 first edition.
Whenever you see:
Bxxx
we are referring to the 1787 second edition.
Thus:
A51/B75
means that the passage occurs on page 51 of the A edition and page 75 of the B edition.
This system is so standard that modern scholarly discussions of Kant's Critique routinely use it rather than ordinary translation page numbers.
This will be particularly useful because you previously used more than one translation.
Translations may have different page numbers. A/B pagination does not.
So we have a permanent set of coordinates.
6. What We Should Do About the Two Editions
My recommendation is:
Use the 1787 B edition as our principal route—but never ignore the A edition where Kant substantially changed his argument.
Why?
The B edition is Kant's later, revised presentation. It is therefore the natural main text for a mature study of the Critique.
But the A edition contains Kant's first formulation of the argument, and sometimes that first formulation reveals something that becomes less visible in the revision.
This is particularly important for your interests.
You are interested in whether Kant's conception of the human knowing subject becomes too restrictive—whether he maps the container of human cognition so tightly that he may inadvertently prevent himself from asking whether the container itself can be transcended.
The A/B differences may become quite revealing in precisely this respect.
7. The First Major Difference We Should Watch
The A edition has a somewhat different philosophical presentation of the relationship between:
sensibility
and
understanding.
The B edition places greater emphasis on the active role of the understanding and on the unity of consciousness in structuring experience.
This is connected to Kant's effort to establish the objective validity of the categories.
In other words:
How does the mind's conceptual activity become legitimately connected to objects of experience?
That is not a peripheral technical question.
It is almost the central engineering problem of Kant's system.
8. The Transcendental Deduction Will Be Our Great Test Case
When we eventually arrive there, I suggest we do something unusual.
We will have:
A Deduction
1781
Then:
B Deduction
1787
And we will ask:
What was Kant trying to prove in A?
What does he change in B?
What problem does the revision address?
Does B actually make the argument stronger?
What has disappeared?
What has been added?
Does the revised argument alter Kant's conception of the knowing subject?
This will be a substantial study in itself.
And it may bear directly on your "paper bag" question.
9. Another Important Change: Phenomena and Noumena
Kant's treatment of the distinction between:
phenomena
and
noumena
also underwent significant revision.
This matters enormously for our purposes.
Remember our question:
Does Kant merely establish the limits of human knowledge, or does he somehow establish that there is something beyond those limits?
The distinction between appearances and things in themselves will be central to that question.
The B edition modifies the presentation in important ways, and scholars disagree about precisely what the changes mean for Kant's transcendental idealism.
So we will eventually compare A and B here rather than simply accepting a textbook interpretation.
10. The Paralogisms Also Matter
The Paralogisms of Pure Reason concern the attempt of reason to establish conclusions about the soul or self.
The A and B treatments differ significantly.
This could become particularly interesting given our earlier discussion of:
consciousness
levels of consciousness
selfhood
reason examining itself.
Kant is going to tell us a great deal about what can and cannot be legitimately inferred about the thinking self.
We should therefore resist the temptation to treat the Paralogisms as merely another technical chapter.
It may become one of the places where your own questions encounter Kant most directly.
11. Kant's Own Claim About the Revision
There is an important point to remember.
Kant did not present the second edition as:
"I was wrong in 1781."
He regarded the revision as preserving the fundamental critical project while making its presentation clearer and more defensible.
That means we should avoid a simplistic interpretation:
A = bad Kant; B = corrected Kant.
That's not justified.
A better attitude is:
A = Kant's first mature formulation.
B = Kant's revised formulation after six additional years of reflection and criticism.
Then we examine the differences.
12. The Six-Year Interval Is Philosophically Important
Between the two editions Kant did not simply sit idle.
The intervening period included:
1783
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
Kant's attempt to give a shorter and more accessible presentation of his critical philosophy after the difficult reception of the Critique.
1785
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
The beginning of his major mature ethical project.
1786
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
An application of the critical project to natural science.
1787
Second edition of the Critique.
Thus the B edition appears in the middle of Kant's rapidly developing mature philosophy, not as an isolated revision.
This is important.
Kant's thinking was alive and developing.
13. The A/B Difference Gives Us a Rare Opportunity
There is something I want to emphasize because it fits beautifully with the way we have decided to study Kant.
We aren't merely going to ask:
"What does Kant say?"
We can sometimes ask:
"Why did Kant decide to say it differently six years later?"
That is an entirely different level of philosophical study.
We can watch a great philosopher think again.
And perhaps discover places where the second thought is better.
Or where the first formulation was actually more revealing.
Or where the revision solves one difficulty while creating another.
14. Our Working Rule for the Two Editions
I suggest that we adopt this permanent rule:
When A and B materially differ, we study the difference rather than silently choosing one.
But we don't want to burden every paragraph with textual comparison.
Therefore:
Minor wording change:
Ignore it.
Clarification with no philosophical consequence:
Note briefly.
Substantial alteration of an argument:
Stop and compare.
Change affecting Kant's conception of knowledge, selfhood, experience, reality, or the limits of reason:
Major comparative analysis.
That will keep the study both thorough and manageable.
15. And One More Reason This Matters for You
Your earlier concern was:
Can reason genuinely examine itself?
The A/B history gives us another version of that question.
Kant's 1781 reason produces a theory.
Then Kant's 1787 reason examines and modifies that theory.
In a sense:
Kant's later reason becomes the critic of Kant's earlier reason.
That doesn't solve your deeper objection.
But it gives us a fascinating natural experiment:
Can reason correct itself without transcending itself?
Kant's own intellectual development gives us something concrete to examine.
16. Our Mental Anchor for the Two Editions
I would put this at the end of the document:
A = Kant's first mature formulation.
B = Kant's revised mature formulation.
We will read B as our main road, but A will remain visible wherever Kant substantially changed the terrain.
And one further principle:
Do not assume that the later Kant is automatically the better Kant.
We will compare.
We will listen.
And we will judge the arguments.
Where We Go Now
The preparatory sequence is now complete:
Background I
Why Kant Had to Write the Critique
Background II
Why Kant Is the Central Sun of Modern Philosophy
Map
The Architecture of the Critique
Background III
The Two Editions: 1781 and 1787 ← we are here
Now I think we should finally stop talking about the Critique and allow Kant himself to enter the room.
Next:
Study I — Preface to the First Edition (A, 1781)
And I would like to take this very seriously.
The Preface is not merely introductory material to get out of the way. Kant is telling us why he thinks metaphysics has failed, why reason is in crisis, what he hopes the Critique will accomplish, and what kind of philosophical revolution he believes he is initiating.
It is the first actual step into the forest.
Ed: I’d like to “read into the record” an item about the mind and reasoning. We should not assume that the mind easily wants to be rational.
Case in point: Yesterday I went for a walk in a nearby woods. As I entered it, I found myself desiring, “I’d like to be particularly aware as I walk. I want to be especially present to the small plants, the pieces of twigs on the path, the leaves on the trees. I want to really see them.” No sooner had I made this assertion that, almost as a shock, I noticed how my mind rebelled against the sense of being “present in the now.”
My thoughts wanted to flit here and there, find something from the past or some such to dwell upon. My own cognitive faculties, as it seemed, were fighting me to avoid centering on the here and now.
And it occurred to me – how difficult it is to remain coherent, how very difficult to actually think logically and clearly about life as it is rather than seeking refuge in some future imagined comfort.
These fantasies constitute the realm of the ego, and I’m wondering if Kant addresses this tendency toward systemic love of distraction. It’s not so easy simply to say “I will now be a rational being.”
Chat: Yes. I think this is an important observation to read into the record, because it introduces a dimension that we should not lose as we study Kant: the difference between possessing reason and actually being able to govern consciousness by reason.
Your walk in the woods provides an almost laboratory-like example.
You made a perfectly intelligible rational intention:
I will be present. I will attend to what is actually here. I will see.
And then you discovered that another part of your mental life had no particular interest in obeying.
It wanted to wander.
That is philosophically significant.
Kant does address part of this—but perhaps not quite in the way you mean.
Kant certainly distinguishes between reason as a rational capacity and the human being as an embodied, desire-bearing creature. And in his moral philosophy this becomes central: the fact that we know what we ought to do does not mean that we automatically want to do it.
Indeed, Kant's conception of morality depends upon this conflict.
A purely rational being would not experience moral obligation in quite the same way. If rationality and desire were perfectly aligned, there would be no inner resistance to overcome. Human beings are distinctive because we can recognize a rational principle and yet experience impulses pulling us elsewhere.
That gives us a preliminary distinction:
Knowing the rational course is not the same thing as having a mind naturally inclined to follow it.
And your woods experience adds another layer:
Even directing attention rationally is difficult.
That is slightly different from the moral problem.
The "systemic love of distraction" is especially interesting
I think your phrase is worth retaining.
You weren't saying:
"I occasionally became distracted."
You noticed something more structural:
The mind seemed to prefer distraction.
It seemed almost to generate alternatives to presence.
Past memory.
Future fantasy.
Internal commentary.
Association.
Anticipation.
Self-concern.
And suddenly the simple act of looking at a leaf became difficult.
This raises a question that precedes Kant's epistemology:
What sort of instrument is the human mind when it is the instrument doing the knowing?
We ordinarily speak as though:
I decide to think clearly → therefore I think clearly.
But your experiment suggests something considerably more complicated:
I decide to think clearly → and then I discover competing processes already operating within me.
That is a very important observation.
Kant's "I think" will eventually become fascinating here
When we get to the Transcendental Deduction, Kant will give enormous importance to what he calls the transcendental unity of apperception, famously associated with:
“The ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my representations.”
This is going to be one of the most important passages in the entire Critique for us.
Because Kant is concerned with the question:
What makes the manifold contents of consciousness belong to one consciousness?
Your woods experience introduces a complementary question:
What makes one's consciousness so difficult to govern?
Those aren't the same question.
Kant is primarily asking about the unity necessary for cognition.
You're asking about the actual behavior of consciousness.
And we should watch to see how much Kant's highly structured account of the knowing subject explains about the messy mental process of a creature strolling in the woods.
There is also a profound distinction between reason and attention
This may prove important.
You were not lacking a rational proposition.
You had one:
Be present. Observe carefully.
The difficulty was implementation.
That suggests that human rationality has at least three dimensions:
1. Recognition
I understand what I ought to do.
2. Intention
I decide to do it.
3. Governance
I actually bring the mind under the direction of that intention.
The third is considerably harder.
And that is where Kant's later practical philosophy may become very relevant.
Your final sentence is exactly right
"It's not so easy simply to say 'I will now be a rational being.'"
Exactly.
And that is a useful warning against treating "reason" as though it were a sovereign king sitting in the executive office of the mind.
Perhaps reason issues orders.
But who—or what—actually runs the kingdom?
That is a much more complicated question.
And it leads directly toward Kant's later conception of autonomy: the rational self must somehow become capable of governing itself rather than merely being pushed around by inclination.
But there is an even deeper question for our Kant study
Your experience suggests that the obstacle may not merely be irrationality.
It may be that the ordinary thinking mind is organized around something other than truth.
That's a much stronger proposition.
If the mind continually escapes the present into memory and fantasy, perhaps it is not merely making logical mistakes.
Perhaps it is pursuing:
- pleasure,
- avoidance,
- anticipation,
- self-protection,
- identity,
- emotional stimulation,
- control,
- or escape from the immediacy of existence.
In other words:
The mind may have motives that precede its reasoning.
And if that's true, then the old Enlightenment picture—
Give human beings sufficient reason and they will become rational—
may be radically incomplete.
This is exactly where I think your observation belongs in our background notes.
A question to carry forward
I would formulate it this way:
Is the human thinking mind naturally oriented toward truth, or does it naturally seek something else and only sometimes submit itself to truth?
And a second:
If reason can recognize what is true but cannot easily govern the mind that recognizes it, what is the relationship between reason and the rest of the person?
Those questions will eventually take us beyond the Critique of Pure Reason into Kant's moral philosophy.
But we shouldn't rush there.
For now, I'd simply put a marker beside your woods experience:
The capacity to reason is not identical with the capacity to sustain rational attention.
And perhaps an even more provocative one:
Before asking what reason can know, we may need to ask what the human thinking mind actually wants to do with what it knows.
That is a very good question to have sitting quietly beside us as we continue into Kant.
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